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BOOK REVIEWS
Dan Morgan. New York: The Viking Press,
1979. Pp. xiv, 387. $14.95. Reviewed by Leo V. Mayer.*
MERCHANTS OF GRAw.

After the Russian grain purchases of 1972, higher food prices for
United States consumers and food shortages in other parts of the
world aroused widespread interest in the conduct and organization
of world trade in foodstuffs. When these events were followed by a
second massive grain sale to the Russians in 1975, Washington
Post reporter Dan Morgan was drawn into three years of study and
travel to find information on the men, money and methods that
allow five or six large multinational companies to control most of
the international trade in basic farm products. He organized his
findings into a book describing these "Merchants of Grain" that
is impressive for its description of their organizational techniques
and frightening for its explanation of the massive economic power
that they possess.
Perhaps the most illuminating aspect of the book is its insight
concerning what multinationality really means to a large international company, i.e., what it means for a business to carry on
day-to-day activities that transcend national boundaries and
national loyalties. The five grain companies-Cargill, Inc. of
Minneapolis, Continental Grain of New York, Andre of Lausanne,
Switzerland, Louis Dreyfus of Paris, and the Bunge Corporation
of Argentina (Cook Industries of Memphis was forced out of the
grain business in 1977 by huge monetary losses)-all operate on
a worldwide scale, buying grain where it is cheapest and selling
where it is dear.
One of the companies, Cargill, is the exclusive agent for the
Australian Wheat Board and sells its wheat, as well as the wheat
of United States farmers. The effect of such a dual representation
can be interesting. Morgan describes how the American agricultural attache' in Tehran helped develop an Iranian market for
United States farm products in the late 1960's by working with,
among others, Cargill's Geneva subsidiary, Tradax. To the attach6's later surprise, he learned that some of the additional im* Senior Specialist for Agriculture, Congressional Research Service, Library of
Congress, Washington. The reviewer formerly served with the President's Council
of Economic Advisors between July 1972 and July 1974 and was on loan from the
Library of Congress to the Office of the President's Special Representative for
Trade Negotiations from March 1978 to June 1979.
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ports of wheat that he had engineered were coming from Australia.
To his further surprise, when he complained to his superiors in
Washington, they took Cargill's side and cabled instructions that
the attache' was "to notify the Iranian government that Tradax is
a reputable international trading firm for which you have no basis
to question their reliability as a supplier and that any earlier information you submitted is withdrawn."'
Morgan describes a second and far more serious example of how
the companies operate without regard to national loyalty. In 1976,
when world wheat supplies began to accumulate again, the Canadian Wheat Board, sensing that it would be unable to move a
major part of its 17 million tons of wheat at going prices, called in
Cargill, Continental, Dreyfus and other firms and made them an
offer: for $135 a ton, it would sell them 4 million tons of wheat then
selling in Minneapolis at $148 a ton. According to Morgan, "this
gave the companies a chance for a highly profitable arbitrage.
They could sell wheat futures in Minneapolis for something close
to the $148 figure and obtain the actual grain in Canada for considerably less than that. It would be up to them to find their own cash
customers." 2
When the companies moved aggressively to find customers for
that wheat in Europe, South America and the Caribbean, USDA
officials in Washington became concerned and tried to ascertain
what was happening. The Canadians refused to reply to official
requests for information and the companies quietly ignored Government officials. While Morgan doesn't point it out, the final
impact showed up in the cold statistics on exports for that year:
United States wheat exports fell 6.1 million tons from a year earlier; Canada's increased by 1.1 million tons.3 Despite the Canadians' actions, both countries experienced sharp increases in carryover stocks for that year.
Apparently, and despite such actions, it was not unusual for
USDA to maintain close working relationships with the multinational grain companies. A major stimulus that led Morgan to
write the book was the supposedly cozy relationship between
USDA and the grain firms that many people felt caused the socalled "Russian Grain Robberies" of 1972 and 1975. Morgan re1. D.
2.
3.
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views this issue in some detail but he also provides so much offsetting background information leading up to those sales that one
comes away feeling that USDA is almost exonerated.4
For example, Morgan describes the burdensome farm surpluses
that began to develop in the late 1940's and how strategists at
USDA and the grain companies saw the solution in persuading
people in other countries to eat as Americans did. He notes, in
passing, that "For better or worse, the encouragement of maximum U.S. exports was momentous in its long-range economic,
diplomatic, political and social implications." 5
While he does not make the connection immediately, he later
implies that one reason the 1972 sales continued even after their
immense impact and inflationary effect became obvious was because "twenty-four years of single-minded policy could not have
been turned around overnight." 6 Having spent the last half of 1972
at the highest levels of the federal government worrying about the
inflationary impact of the Russian sale, I can attest to the slowness
with which policies change after they have been in effect for a
quarter of a century.
A second theme of the book relates to the secrecy with which the
large multinational grain firms operate. A writer with a more favorable view of their activities might have described the companies
as operating quietly and efficiently rather than in secrecy, but, in
either event, it is true that their day to day activities are carried
out behind closed doors. There are no requirements that they must
disclose even the magnitude of their annual gross sales or the origins and destinations of the sales and certainly not the net incomes
of the owning families. The ability to do this stems from the nature
of ownership; seven families control the six companies. These
seven families were, until quite recently, able to accumulate the
necessary capital to grow and expand without tapping public
money markets. Only Cook Industries finally had to "go public"
to finance its expansion and the lesson of its forced publication of
public reports at inopportune times will not be lost on the other
companies.
Secrecy in grain merchandising is not solely a fact of private
4. USDA actions also meshed well with the high priority given Soviet trade
expansion by the Nixon Administration. See C. Osakwe, Legal and Institutional
Barriers to United States-Soviet Trade: Soviet Perspectives, 8 VAND. J.

L. 85 (1974).
5. D. MORGAN, supra note 1, at 100.
6. Id., at 155.
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ownership. Morgan describes in detail the actions in the grain pits
at the Chicago Board of Trade, where prices advance and fall on
any small piece ofnew information. He observes that even the "sex
life of corn" becomes important since if rainfall interrupts the
pollenization process at the critical stage, the crop can be damaged. If this happens, a smaller crop will result and prices can
skyrocket. For companies that may already have sold millions of
bushels of that crop to overseas customers at a fixed price, bankruptcy may hang in the balance. It pays to know, consequently,
before anyone else does, whether the likelihood is for good or bad
crops, both in the supplying areas and in the buying areas. All this
naturally leads toward a secretive environment for the operation
of the grain trade.
Beyond the secrecy, or perhaps in support of it, each of the
companies conducts a worldwide information gathering network
that allows it to know what is going on around the world. This
communication and information system provides the most up to
the minute source of information possible and one that is generally
thought to be superior even to the United States government's
system. This, at least, was the view of USDA's Assistant Secretary
for International Affairs in 1976. He testified before the Senate
Subcommittee on Multinational Companies in favor of a tax break
for the grain companies because "There's a U.S. public interest in
supporting the companies. They're the ones who keep us posted as
to what's going on all over the world. Their system is ahead of
ours." 7 What he did not point out was that they also have the
ability to withhold information when it is to their advantage, and
apparently have done so in the past, if USDA's version of the
Soviet grain sales is accepted.
It is at points like these that Morgan's book is a bit frightening.
By the nature of their activities-the purchase, allocation and distribution of items essential to human survival-and by the nature
of their massive size-Morgan claims Cargill and Continental each
handle about a quarter of United States farm exports which now
run at about $32 billion annually (and this is only the United
States part of their sales)-the companies operate on a scale and
with such influence that they almost make the federal government
look small.
In fact, their actions are often more effective than those of the
United States government. Morgan cites the case of the West Afri7.

Id., at 224.
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can country of Zdire which, as prices for its primary export of
copper fell in 1974, was unable to maintain its international payments. While other creditors complained to their government,
Continental Grain in late 1976 took the step of diverting its
monthly wheat shipment to another location. As flour output
dwindled and lines of people formed outside bakeries, "Zdirean
officials hastily convened with representatives of Continental and
agreed to all the company's demands."' Morgan notes that wheat
has joined oil and technology as a means of wielding unique power
over governments and people.
The troubling part about the new international importance of
food is that unlike oil and technology, the exchange of food between nations is conducted without significant direction from a
code of international law. While there are international treaties
governing the exchange and use of patented or copyrighted items,
the exchange of food is based largely on the principle of caveat
emptor. Actions between the companies are based on a gentlemanly trust which is not always followed. In this voracious environment, the massive size of the companies becomes a substitute
for legal recourse but even size is relative. This was the lesson Cook
Industries learned in 1977 when, having lost millions to the Hunts
of Texas in the soybean pits at Chicago, it was forced to sell major
parts of its grain operations to Mitsui, a giant Japanese trading
company.
The economic risk of operating in a legal no-mans land is substantial but there are other risks as well. The very fact that ownership of the companies is concentrated in so few families raises a
prospect of personal danger for family members. Extremist groups
who feel that the companies use their power unfairly can act violently to redress that inequity. One such event occurred on September 19, 1974, in downtown Buenos Aires, when members of an
Argentine youth movement, the Montoneros, stopped rush hour
traffic and kidnapped brothers Jorge and Juan Born, heirs apparent to the power and fortune of the Bunge Corporation. Brother
Juan was released in March 1975 after a near-emotional collapse
and brother Jorge was released on June 18, 1975, but only after $60
million had been handed over to the Montoneros. Morgan claims
that the ransom amount was equivalent to one-third of the annual
Argentine defense budget. Placing that much money in the hands
of an insurgent group must have caused a certain amount of anxi8. Id., at 227.
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ety in Argentine government circles. But the company acted to
protect its line of management in which the government apparently had an inherent interest.
Events that cause personal harm to members of the owning families are rare. But the prospect does keep the families living secluded lives. One of the more interesting parts of Morgan's book
is the description that he gives of the personal lives of the dynastic
grain-trading families. From their original trading activities in the
middle of the 19th century, the grain trading families have been
risk-takers, demonstrating a capacity to gain control over critical
links in the grain trade systems. First, it was the flour mills on
which people depended for bread, then it was the railroads and the
ocean shipping vessels that controlled movement of grain, and next
came the purchase of hundreds of small-town elevators that dot
the landscape of the Midwest.
Today, the Companies own fleets of railroad hopper cars that
allow them to move grain at exactly the right time from their
Midwest elevators to their Gulf elevators that load it on oceangoing vessels at ports like Galveston or New Orleans. Overseas, the
companies own similar kinds of facilities that are essential to feeding millions of people everyday. As one reads what little Morgan
could discover of their operations, it seems clear that their activities can be viewed as benevolent or dictatorial or a combination of
the two.
What is far more clear from Morgan's book is that the grain
companies are profitmaking enterprises that take risks unimaginable to the average person. For the burden of carrying those
risks, they expect to be paid and in general they achieve that end.
But they also experience losses such as the 35 million loss suffered by Continental Grain in early 1975 when Turkey cancelled
high-priced contracts for American wheat. Continental Grain had
already bought the grain from American farmers at the high prices
and when the sale was cancelled, Continental had to find a new
buyer at lower prices. While it was an unusual experience, American wheat growers probably benefitted at Continental's expense.
Morgan also deals with a number of other important issues,
including the question of whether an international grain reserve
should be created. Morgan observes that "almost everyone knowledgeable about this subject agrees that some kind of international
system of grain reserves is essential to prevent a recurrence of the
near calamity of 1972-74"1 but he goes on to describe the political
9. Id., at 358.
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problems that stand in the way of any international agreement.
The picture he paints is not very optimistic: food shortages and
price surges are not part of the past.
He spends most of the final chapter of the book reviewing information on the problem of world hunger and its solution. With the
aplomb that is probably best suited to the subject, he notes that
"the food crisis is like the oil crisis in that figures on production,
reserves, and demand can be juggled to suit any theory about the
future."' 0 Few serious analysts of the subject would argue with
him.
Where analysts of the grain trade will argue with Morgan is in
his general assesssment of the role of the grain companies in solving international food problems. The grain companies view themselves as acting in humanitarian ways, albeit it for a profit. In fact,
a favorable view of them would be that they do have the capacity
to move quickly and to feed people that might otherwise starve
during sudden drops in local food production. Similarly, they also
make it possible for the United States Government to operate food
aid programs in the most remote areas of the world to prevent
famine. But the other side of this coin is that the price they charge
for these humanitarian services is high, measured in terms of the
profits they gain from the rest of their trading activities. The question Morgan implicitly raises is whether they should be allowed the
oligopolistic position they now hold for the beneficial aspects of
what they do or whether a more public grain trading system would
be desirable. As one reads the book, it is possible to be swayed in
both directions at different times and even with the actions of the
different companies.
The companies do differ in their operations and their codes of
conduct. One major reason for taking the time necessary to read
this very readable book is the author's insights on how the companies operate. Their actions are important to anyone with a serious
interest in the world's food system and a concern about the next
round of world food shortages.
10.

Id., at 347.

Lord Denning. London: Butterworths,
1979. Pp. xxii, 331. Reviewed by P. F. Ashman*

THE DISCIPLINE OF LAW.

Since 1945, the United Kingdom has seen a probably irreversible
shift of power over almost every aspect of the life of the citizen
away from the individual and towards small groups, most notably
the Government, national and local administrators, companies
and trade unions. The law has, to a large extent, been employed
to effect this shift. At the same time, many Britons have looked
to the law for protection against the careless use, and especially
abuse, of those powers, and to safeguard individual rights generally. How has the law fared in these new circumstances? More
particularly, how have the judges fared in their duty to interpret
and apply the law?
In THE DIsCIPLINE OF LAW, Lord Denning sets out to demonstrate
that "the principles of law laid down by the Judges in the nineteenth century-however suited to social conditions of that
time-are not suited to the social necessities and social opinion of
the twentieth century. They should be moulded and shaped to
meet the needs and opinion of today." Few people in England are
better qualified to make such a judgment than Lord Denning, who
celebrated his 80th birthday in January of this year. Called to the
Bar in 1923, he was appointed a High Court Judge in 1946, a Lord
Justice of Appeal in 1949, created a Lord of Appeal in Ordinary in
1957, and appointed Master of the Rolls in 1962.
The book is divided into seven parts, each examining through
the cases one aspect of the principles of law-procedural and substantive-"as they have been, as they are and as they should be"
where progress has been most marked. These are: the construction
of documents; the misuse of Ministerial powers; locus standi;
abuse of "group" powers; the "High Trees" principle; negligence;
and the doctrine of precedent. In each area of the law Lord
Denning has played the major part in reform, or in proposing reform, and he quotes extensively from his own judgments-not, as
he says, out of conceit-but because he is most familiar with them.

* LL.B., University of London. Barrister, Legal Assistant to JUSTICE, the
British Section of the International Commission of Jurists.

500

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 12:491

No one should be put off by this. Lord Denning is a master craftsman in the use of the English language. Simplicity and clarity are
his hallmarks and few judges have equalled his ability to translate
the most arcane and complex legal and factual issues into language
readily comprehensible to the layman. Indeed, one suspects that
this, as much as their content, is the reason for the enduring popularity of his judgments among law students and for their usefulness
to practitioners.
Undoubtedly, Lord Denning is one of the most able English
judges of this century. With a remarkable degree of success, he has
sought to rid English law of many of its archaic fetters: to banish
the "officious by-stander" from the construction of documents; to
extend natural justice so that tribunals are brought 'ithin the
purview of the courts; and to curb the royal prerogatives which
Ministers now exercise for the Crown. He has all but killed off the
doctrine of consideration in contracts by smothering it under the
shield of promissory estoppel. Negligence has been expanded
under his guidance so that today "the boundaries of negligence are
never closed," and he has fought hard to free the judges from their
self-imposed restraints on matters of public policy and the doctrine
of stare decisis. Indeed, in many ways the title of this book seems
ironic. Although "Discipline" is used in the old sense of learning,
Lord Denning has never taken kindly to its popular meaning.
Lord Denning's perception of the role of the judiciary has not
gone unchallenged. His most vocal critics have been the judges in
the House of Lords (the Law Lords) when they have been given the
opportunity to review his judgments. Few appellants have the resources to take cases up to the House of Lords and the procedural
hurdles are also difficult to overcome, so most appeals proceed no
further than the Court of Appeal. In 1957 Lord Denning was created a Law Lord, but it is no secret that he felt too constricted
there and in 1962 he returned to the Court of Appeal to become
Master of the Rolls, the head of its Civil Division. A Master of the
Rolls can choose which cases to hear and, to a limited extent,
ensure that at least one of the other two Lords Justice of Appeal
are sympathetic to his views. This position gives him enormous
influence over the development of case law, and even his dissenting
judgments have great persuasive authority.
Now it is axiomatic in English law that judges apply the law in
accordance with settled principles and decided cases and that they
do not seek to create law, which is the job of Parliament. Inevitably, however, when litigation takes place, a judge has to choose
between differing interpretations; of statutes, or documents, or he
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must determine how the principles derived from precedent should
be applied to new and unforseen factual situations. This is the way
in which the law develops. Lord Denning's view is that the role of
the judge is to do "what to justice shall appertain," as the Sovereign used to commend to the Justices on the opening of every
Assize. Where the judge is faced with a choice, he should "choose
the meaning which is in accord with reason and justice" rather
than adopt the meaning which will impart certainty into the law
at the expense of injustice to the individual litigant.
To the more conservative judges, this approach was almost tantamount to heresy, and throughout his book there are examples of
criticisms of Lord Denning by the Law Lords ("the voices of infallibility") for going too far, too fast; or dissent from his brethren in
the Court of Appeal ("the timorous souls"). His greatest critic was
undoubtedly the late Viscount Simonds, a Law Lord from 1944 to
1962, and Lord Denning quotes one passage from the case of
Midland Silicones Ltd. v. Scruttons Ltd.,' which exemplifies
Viscount Simonds' traditional view of the role of the English judge
and his hostility to the whole Denning approach. In that case the
House of Lords had to consider the rights of a third party beneficiary to a contract. In the Court of Appeal, Lord Justice Denning,
as he then was, had suggested in several cases that it was open to
judges to hold that such contracts could be enforced for the benefit
of the third party, as had been recommended by the Law Reform
Committee in 1937. Lord Simonds condemned his efforts thus:
• . . (There is) a principle which is, I suppose, as well established
as any in our law, a 'fundamental' principle

. . .

an 'elementary'

principle as it has been called times without number that only a
person who is a party to a contract can sue upon it ....

Learned

counsel for the respondents claimed that this was the orthodox view
and asked your Lordships to reject any proposition that impinged
upon it. To that invitation I readily respond. For to me heterodoxy,
or, as some might say, heresy, is not the more attractive because it
is dignified by the name of reform. Nor will I be easily led by an
undiscerning zeal for some abstract kind of justice according to law,
the law which is established for us by Act of Parliament or the
binding authority of precedent. The law is developed by the application of old principles to new circumstances. Therein lies its genius.
Its reform by the abrogation of those principles is the task not of the
courts of law but of Parliament. Therefore I reject the argument of
the appellants under this head and invite your Lordships to say that
1. [1962] A.C. 446.
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certain statements (of Denning LJ) which appear to support it in
recent cases . . . must be rejected.
On an earlier occasion, Lord Simonds had described Lord
Denning's proposition that it was the duty of the courts to find out
the intention of Parliament when interpreting statutes as "a naked
usurpation of the legislative function under the thin disguise of
interpretation." Lord Denning's answer to these criticisms is that
the Lords are "somewhat out 6f touch with contemporary problems," and there is no doubt that he has largely succeeded in
sidestepping the limitations on him by the use of "adroit procedural steps."
No one who reads this fascinating account of the beliefs and
modus operandiof a brilliant judge can deny the very real benefits
that Lord Denning has bestowed on English law. In presenting his
case for greatly increased judicial discretion, however, he has done
rather less than justice to the arguments of his opponents. English
law has no code of principles or written constitution to guide the
judges in their interpretations of the law. Principles are derived
from precedents and when citizens enter into legal relations with
one another their legal advisers are guided by these precedents.
They are entitled to expect that what is lawful one month should
not suddenly be unlawful during the next month because some
deserving litigant comes before the court and the precedents are
overruled in order to do him justice. A judge will only hear argument from opposing counsel and many other issues may be involved in the legal principle under question which go unargued by
either counsel and are thus not considered by the judge. Unless an
amicus curiae is to be employed at many more cases than at present, much injustice can be done without anyone realizing it. This
is particularly true of property transactions which are intended to
be of long duration. Lord Denning has been notably successful in
protecting the equitable interests of deserted wives, of mistresses,
and of the other dependents of the holders of legal titles. While this
may have done much justice for the individuals who have come
before him, it has created much concern and trouble for mortgagees, prospective purchasers and others whose legitimate interests
are also deserving of protection.
Equally, in a democratic society it is right and proper that the
elected representatives of the people should be the major initiators
of law reform, after consideration of all the issues involved. No
group of judges, however wise, can be an adequate alternative for
the deliberations of Parliamentary Committees, Law Commissions, Law Reform Committees and other official bodies which
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canvas the widest opinion before making recommendations. Moreover, such bodies are far more likely to be familiar with contemporary problems and to reflect the often competing interests of social
groups than the English judiciary. In a report on the judiciary
published by JUSTICE in 1972, a survey of the social class origins of
the judges of the Superior Courts revealed that in 1968 some 15.3
percent of judges were drawn from the traditional landed upper
class and 60.1 percent from the upper middle classes. Only 9.6
percent were drawn from the lower middle class and 1.3 percent
from the working classes, who comprise over half the population.
This last figure is less than half the number of judges of working
class origin in 1820.
These figures are important because the various social classes
have very different views about what rights are important to protect. Thus, for example, in the field of labour law the upper middle
classes are much more concerned to protect the right of the individual to carry on his occupation without interference, whereas the
working classes place much more importance on group rights
vested in bodies such as trade unions. Similar differences appear
in health, education, housing and welfare; and in recent years
there has been much controversy about the private versus the public provision of these services. Some matters are supremely political in character, and the judges-appointed at the discretion of the
Lord Chancellor and holding office until retirement-can run the
risk of doing considerable harm to their reputation for unbiased
impartiality by intervening in them.
A good example can be found in the Gouriet2 case, which is
quoted at length. In 1977, the Union of Post Office Workers decided to break the law by refusing-to handle mail to South Africa
for one week as a protest against apartheid. The Attorney-General
refused to bring proceedings or give his consent to a relator action
to stop them. Mr. Gouriet, a private citizen, sought an order to
restrain the union, which took the objection that he had no locus
standi. The Court of Appeal overruled this objection and granted
the order. Lord Denning considered whether the courts could review the refusal of the Attorney-General to act and held that they
could. The House of Lords overruled him. Lord Wilberforce, in a
passage not quoted in the book, stated:
The distinction between public rights, which the Attorney-General
could, and the individual having no special interest could not, seek
2.

Gouriet v. Union of Postal Workers [1978] A.C. 435.
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to enforce, and private rights is fundamental to our law. To break
it. . . is not a development of the law, but a destruction of one of
its pillars . . . . (Executive decisions) which were of the type to

attract political criticism and controversy showed that they were
outside the range of discretionary problems which the courts could
resolve.
Despite this reversal, there is no doubt that Lord Denning has put
politicians on their guard-which is no bad thing-so that today
no Minister can be sure that his legislation is "Denning-proof," as
one junior Minister in the last Labour Government put it.
Another interesting example of the dangers which some see in
the Denning approach and which also bears on the influence of the
social outlook of judges is to be found in Ward v.' Bradford
Corporation,3 a famous case not mentioned in this book. Miss
Ward was a student at a teacher training college who, contrary to
the regulations, had permitted her boyfriend to spend two months
with her in the student hall of residence. On being discovered, she
was asked to quit the hall, which she did. The matter got into the
local press. The Disciplinary Committee of her college considered
the events and expelled Miss Ward in a process which the Courts
found to be in clear breach of the rules of natural justice. The
Court of Appeal declined to exercise its discretion to quash the
expulsion order. Lord Denning said:
Instead of going into lodgings, she had this man with her, night after
night, in the hall of residence where such a thing was absolutely
forbidden. That is a fine example to set to others! And she, a girl
training to be a teacher! I expect the Governors and the staff all
thought that she was quite an unsuitable person for it. She would
never make a teacher. No parent would knowingly entrust their
child to her care.
Such decisions inevitably induce one to question the extent to
which the judges are familiar with contemporary morals in a pluralistic society, and to which they should permit their particular
moral outlook to determine their view of justice.
In a television interview to mark his 80th birthday, Lord
Denning summarized his views thus:
I do what I think is right. And I know a thing is right because I feel
it. And because I feel it, I know I am right.
Faced with this view, many lawyers and laymen might prefer the
3.

[1972] 70 L.G.R. 27.

Spring 1979]

BOOK REVIEWS

505

judges to be tied to certain law, despite occasional injustices,
rather than see justice tied to certain judges, despite the law.
This is an important book for all students of common law jurisdictions. No more persuasive argument for setting the judge free
to keep law and justice close together, in accordance with reason,
is likely to be found. The "turbulent" Master of the Rolls has done
more than most "to keep the path of justice clear of obstructions
which would impede it." Indeed, few would dissent from the proposition that Lord Denning, whatever his faults, has been both necessary and beneficial to English law throughout the post-war era of
rapid change. It is doubtful, though, that the same unanimity of
opinion could be found for the view that far more judges should be
like him.
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